The wrath of God : macroeconomic costs of natural disasters by Raddatz, Claudio
Policy Research Working Paper 5039
The Wrath of God






















































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5039
The process of global climate change has been associated 
with an increase in the frequency of climatic disasters. 
Yet, there is still little systematic evidence on the 
macroeconomic costs of these episodes. This paper 
uses panel time-series techniques to estimate the short 
and long-run impact of climatic and other disasters on 
a country's GDP. The results indicate that a climate 
related disaster reduces real GDP per capita by at least 
0.6 percent. Therefore, the increased incidence of 
these disasters during recent decades entails important 
macroeconomic costs. Among climatic disasters, droughts 
This paper—a product of the Growth and the Macroeconomics Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger 
effort in the department to understand the impact of external shocks and of the process of climate change. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at craddatz@
worldbank.org.  
have the largest average impact, with cumulative losses of 
1 percent of GDP per capita. Across groups of countries, 
small states are more vulnerable than other countries to 
windstorms, but exhibit a similar response to other types 
of disasters; and low-income countries responds more 
strongly to climatic disasters, mainly because of their 
higher response to droughts. However, a country's level 
of external debt has no relation to the output impact 
of any type of disaster. The evidence also indicates that, 
historically, aid flows have done little to attenuate the 
output consequences of climatic disasters.The Wrath of God: Macroeconomic Costs of Natural Disasters
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Shortly after hurricane Katrina hit the US Gulf Coast in August 2005, risk-modeling companies
raised their estimation of the probability of a similar event from once every 40 years to once every
20 years, as a result of the warming of water temperatures in the North Atlantic Basin. This
reassessment of the likelihood and severity of climatic disasters is not particular to the US and
has taken place all over the world, as concerns about the consequences of global warming on world
climate have increased in recent years.
Despite the increased interest in the consequences of climate change for the incidence of natural
disasters, there is little systematic evidence on the macroeconomic consequences of these events
that could provide a sense of the magnitude of the challenge. Existing evidence mainly consists of
policy analyses based on simple correlations in a limited number of case studies (see for example
Albala-Bertrand (1993), Otero and Marti (1995), Rasmussen (2004)) and on cross-country growth
regressions (Skidmore and Toya (2002)). Although case studies can be insightful, they cannot isolate
the impact of a disaster because they do not control for other simultaneous shocks. Also, the limited
number of cases casts some doubts on the generality of the conclusions, and the selection of the
cases, which is not random, is another source of concern. Cross-country growth regressions address
some of these concerns but lack explicit dynamics, so their results are not informative of the short-
run e￿ect of disasters, and the methodology su￿ers from the standard criticisms associated with the
possibility of omitted-variable bias, and additional problems resulting from the need to aggregate
disasters across time. Outside academia, the proprietary models used by the insurance industry,
while highly detailed, focus only on the insurance losses of speci￿c events, mostly on developed
countries.
This paper quanti￿es the macroeconomic consequences of climatic and other disasters in devel-
oping countries using a uni￿ed framework based on a vector auto-regression (VAR) model. Under
the uncontroversial assumption that natural catastrophes are exogenous to a country’s short-run
performance, this approach provides estimates of the average impact on GDP of several types of
disasters at various frequencies. Because of the short time-dimension of the series available, most
of the analysis uses panel autoregressive distributed lags (PARDL) and panel vector autoregression
(PVAR) models that restrict the response of various groups of developing countries to be identical. 1
This methodology provides an estimate of the output cost of a given type of disaster on a typical
country within a group, which can be used as a starting point in the evaluation of the overall costs
of an increased likelihood of these events, such as resulting, for instance, from climate change.
The analysis con￿rms that the incidence of climatic disasters has increased during the last
four decades, and indicates that natural disasters, especially climatic ones, have a moderate but
signi￿cant negative impact on real GDP per capita. A conservative estimate of their macroeconomic
1A similar approach has previously been used by Deaton and Miller (1995) to estimate the impact of commodity
prices in African countries, Broda (2004) to estimate the impact of terms of trade socks in countries with di￿erent
exchange regimes, and Ahmed (2003) to determine the e￿ect of di￿erent sources of economic ￿uctuations in six Latin
American countries.
1cost is that a climatic disaster a￿ecting at least half a percent of a country’s population, which in
the whole sample period occurs once every four years, reduces real GDP per capita in 0.6 percent.
Therefore, the increase in the incidence of these disasters observed in the data can entail non-trivial
macroeconomic costs. For instance, with the average incidence post-1990 of one climatic disaster
every three years instead, these disasters would reduce GDP per-capita in 2 percent over a decade.
The ￿ndings also indicate that, historically, ￿ows of o￿cial development assistance (ODA) do
not importantly attenuate the output consequences of climatic disasters. Explicitly considering
ODA in the model only reduces the output impact of climatic disasters from 0.77 to 0.63 percent
of per capita GDP, and this reduction is not statistically signi￿cant.
Among climatic disasters, droughts have the largest average impact, with cumulative losses of
1 percent of GDP per capita. Extreme temperatures also have a large average impact of 5 percent
of GDP per capita, but results for this type of climatic disaster are based only on a sample of 12
countries. Other types of climatic disasters, such as windstorms (e.g. hurricanes and cyclones) and
￿oods do not have a signi￿cant impact when looking at the broad set of countries a￿ected by any
type of climatic disaster.
Across broad disaster’s categories, small states are not signi￿cantly more a￿ected than larger
countries. However, wind storms have a larger estimated impact on small states than other countries.
Among small states, windstorms typically result in a 3 percent decline in per capita GDP, while
they have virtually no impact on larger states.
Output in low-income countries responds more strongly to climatic disasters. Among these
countries, a climatic disaster results in a 1 percent decline in per-capita GDP that is also statistically
signi￿cant at the 10 percent level during the initial years. In contrast, among middle and high-
income countries, climatic disasters result in output losses of 0.5 and 0.25 percent, respectively.
This larger response of low-income countries to climatic disasters is mainly due to the large output
impact of droughts on this group, which reaches 2 percent of per capita GDP. In contrast, there is
no signi￿cant response to any type of disaster (climatic and other) among middle and high income
countries.
The level of external debt has no relation to the impact of any type of disasters. Output losses
for climatic disasters are almost identical for countries with low, medium, and high initial levels of
debt. Distinguishing among di￿erent types of climatic disasters (droughts, extreme temperatures,
￿oods, and windstorms) does not change this conclusion; for no type of climatic (and non-climatic)
disaster there is a clearly di￿erential response among more indebted countries.
This paper contributes to a long literature that has aims to estimate the economic consequences
of natural disasters. A large part of this literature relies on simple correlations arising from a limited
number of case studies (see for example Albala-Bertrand (1993) and Otero and Marti (1995)). This
approach permits focusing on the details of a particular event, but cannot isolate the impact of
a disaster because, by construction, cannot control for other simultaneous shocks. For instance,
disasters may be followed by aid ￿ows that attenuate their macroeconomic consequences. Also, the
limited number of cases typically analyzed (26 cases in Albala-Bertrand (1993)) also casts doubts on
2the generality and external validity of the conclusions. A di￿erent strand of this literature has started
to use broad recently-available data sources to provide systematic evidence on the macroeconomic
impact of disasters. Skidmore and Toya (2002) study the long-run growth consequences of natural
disasters using data on the incidence of several types of disasters on a large sample of countries.
They use cross-country regressions to determine the relation between the incidence of disasters
(measured as the total number of disasters per land area) and growth, and ￿nd a positive e￿ect
of climatic disasters and a negative e￿ect (although not always signi￿cant) of geological disasters.
Although the paper controls for several country characteristics, the possibility of omitted variable
bias and endogeneity cannot be ruled out in this setting.2
To overcome some of the problems associated with the cross-country approach, other papers have
exploited the within country, time-series variation in the occurrence of disasters. Ramcharan (2007),
and Noy (2009) use standard dynamic panel speci￿cations to estimate the impact of disasters on
various aspects of macroeconomic performance. Ramcharan (2007) estimates the di￿erential impact
of earthquakes and windstorms in 120 countries with ￿xed and ￿exible exchange rate regimes during
the period 1961-2000 to test the hypothesis that a ￿exible exchange rate helps smoothing real shocks.
Noy (2009) uses similar data to estimate the short run impact of disasters on growth controlling
for the magnitude of a disaster and to relate the impact to structural characteristics such as the
quality of institutions, ￿nancial development, and human capital. The close relation of these papers
with the dynamic panel literature leads them, however, to not fully exploit the time variation of
the data and to rely on restricted functional forms and identi￿cation assumptions. In particular,
they impose the lag structure instead of deriving it from standard lag tests, assume ￿rst di￿erence
stationarity instead of testing for the stationarity of the variables, and rely on some controversial
identi￿cation assumptions: exogeneity of exchange rate regimes in the case of Ramcharan (2007)
and predeterminedness of variables (which is sensitive to the lag speci￿cation) in the case of Noy
(2009). A recent paper by Raddatz (2007) addresses some of these problems using standard time-
series techniques in a PVAR model, and relying on identi￿cation assumptions based mainly on the
exogeneity of external shocks. However, this paper studies the impact of a broad set of external
shocks and, therefore, treats natural disasters in a highly parsimonious manner that disregards part
of the information contained in speci￿c types of shocks and also group disaster prone countries with
those that have never experience these types of episodes.
This paper contributes to this literature by providing systematic evidence on the output cost
of natural disasters coming from a large and comprehensive set of di￿erent types of catastrophes
on a large sample of countries and over an extensive period of time, applying standard time-series
techniques that exploit mainly the within-country time series variation of the data and provide
a natural manner of assessing the short and long run impact of disasters, and only relying on
relatively uncontroversial assumptions about the exogeneity of disasters from within country output
￿uctuations.
2Although the occurrence of disasters is arguably exogenous, the criteria used to record events in the existing
databases make disasters occurring in poor countries more likely to be recorded. Pure cross-country variation does
not permit to control for this possibility.
3This paper also relates to several recent articles that study how the impact of disasters vary
with a country’s structural characteristics or stage of development. Toya and Skidmore (2007) study
the relation between various country characteristics besides income and the expected mortality and
losses (as fraction of GDP) caused by natural disasters in a sample of 151 countries between 1960
and 2003, ￿nding that higher educational attainment, greater openness, a strong ￿nancial sector,
and smaller government were associated with a smaller cost of disasters. Benson et al. (2004) argue
on theoretical grounds that the impact of disasters is the highest among middle income countries,
where sectors are more interconnected than in poor countries but lack the coping mechanisms
available in rich countries. These predictions are partially supported by evidence from Kellenberg
and Mobarak (2008), who show that the relation between income and the deaths arising from ￿oods
and windstorms has an inverted U-shape. This paper contributes to this literature by providing
complementary evidence on the costs of disasters across di￿erent groups of countries.
Finally, the paper also relates to the new empirical research on the macroeconomic consequences
of climate change, in particular, to Dell et al. (2008), who estimate the impact of changes in tem-
perature on growth at annual frequencies, and ￿nd that temperature increases have a signi￿cantly
negative e￿ect on growth in poor countries. The evidence on this paper complements Dell et al.
(2008), by showing that droughts and extreme temperature episodes, those most likely related to
rising temperatures indeed have a stronger impact on low income countries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources, the main
variables to use and presents summary statistics for the incidence of natural disasters around the
world. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology used in the paper to estimate the output
consequences of natural disasters. Section 4 presents in detail the main results of the paper. Section
5 concludes.
2 Data
Data for natural disasters were obtained from the Emergency Disasters Database (EM-DAT) main-
tained by the for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (2008) (CRED). This is a comprehensive
database that includes data on the occurrence and e￿ects of over 12,800 mass-disasters in the world
since 1900, and is compiled from a diversity of sources. As a general principle, to enter into the
database an event has to meet any of the following conditions: there are ten or more people reported
killed; there are 100 or more people reported a￿ected; a state of emergency is declared; or there is
a call for international assistance.
The data contain information on various types of disasters that I classify in three broad cate-
gories. Geological disasters include earthquakes, landslides, volcano eruptions, and tidal waves. An
important characteristic of this type of events is their unpredictability and relatively fast onset. The
second category is climatic disasters. This category includes ￿oods, droughts, extreme temperatures,
and windstorms (e.g. hurricanes). Compared to the previous category, some of these disasters can
be forecasted well in advance (so precautions can be undertaken) and have a relatively long onset.
4Since these are the disasters whose incidence is most likely to be a￿ected by the ongoing process
of global climate change, I also consider them individually in the analysis. The ￿nal category is a
residual group that includes famines, epidemics, insect plagues, wild ￿res, miscellaneous accidents,
industrial accidents, and transport accidents.3
In each category, the incidence of disasters is measured by counting the annual number of events
that classify as large disasters according to the following criteria established by the International
Monetary Fund (see Fund (2003)): the event either a￿ects at least half a percent of a country’s
population, or causes damages to the capital stock, housing, human lives, etc. of at least half a
percent of national GDP, or results in more than one fatality for every 10,000 people.
Starting from this variable, I also construct a di￿erent measure that not only counts the num-
ber of disasters but also takes into account the month of the year when a disaster occurs, in a
manner similar to Noy (2009). This allows disasters occurring early in the year to have a di￿erent
contemporaneous impact that those that happen near the end of the year. This is basically a re-
normalization of the incidence measure described above, since just counting the number of disasters
yields an estimation of the output costs of a disaster occurring at the sample mean date during
the year. Taking into account the date of occurrence, produces an estimate of the output cost of a
disaster occurring January 1st.
Since the main goal of the paper is to estimate the impact of natural disasters related to the
process of climate change, the analysis focuses on the set of countries that has experienced at least
one large climatic disaster since 1950. This group of countries is shown in Figure 1, which maps the
incidence of climatic disasters in the world (average number of disasters per year in each country,
divided in four quartiles). It shows that these disasters occur across the world but tend to be more
heavily concentrated in countries located around the Indian and Paci￿c oceans, probably related
to the in￿uence of El Niæo. Figure 2 displays similar information as Figure 1, but separately for
each type of climatic disasters (Panels A to D). Here the geographic clustering of various types of
disasters is more evident. Wind storms tend to occur more frequently in the Caribbean, the Bay
of Bengal, and around the East China Sea. Sub-Saharan Africa is mainly a￿ected by droughts,
and to a lesser extent, by ￿oods, which are also frequent in Latin America. In contrast, extreme
temperatures are concentrated in Europe, with some incidence also in Australia and South America.
There has recently been much discussion about the impact of the process of global warming on
the incidence of natural disasters around the world. Figure 3 shows that the data indeed exhibits
an increase in the incidence of climatic disasters during the last four decades. The average world
incidence of climatic disasters (disasters per country) has increased from 10 percent in the early
1960s to about 30 percent in the late 1990s (Panel B). This is not the case for geological disasters
that are not related to the global warming process (Panel A), so this trend is not purely caused
by an increase in the frequency with which disasters are recorded in the database. For the residual
3Some of these events, such as famines, may be endogenous and related to the incidence of other truly exogenous
disasters. Other, such as industrial accidents, are not natural disasters. They are included as a broad way of
controlling for other episodes that may occur simultaneously to some of the disasters under analysis. The results are
largely unchanged if this category is excluded or restricted to include only the most clearly exogenous events.
5category that includes famines and wild ￿res (which are indirectly related to the climate) there is
also an increasing, albeit less sharp trend. This increasing incidence of climatic disasters is not
concentrated in a few countries but is a prevalent phenomenon. In fact, in almost all countries
the average incidence (number of disasters per year) during 1985-2006 is larger in the period than
during 1960-1984 (not reported).
Data on macroeconomic performance and other types of external shocks (used as controls in
part of the analysis) come from various sources. Real GDP per-capita is measured in constant
2000 U.S. dollars and obtained from the Bank (2008) World Development Indicators (WDI). The
terms-of-trade index is the ratio of export prices to import prices computed using the current and
constant price values of exports and imports from the national accounts component of the Penn
World Tables (version 6.1) and updated using the terms-of-trade data from WDI. Real per capita
aid ￿ows include the ￿ows of o￿cial development assistance (ODA) and o￿cial aid in constant 2000
U.S. dollars, and was obtained from the WDI. Aid as a fraction of Gross National Income was also
obtained from the WDI. Summary statistics for these variables for the sample of countries during
the period of analysis are presented in Table 1. To have good coverage on all macroeconomic and
disaster variables, the ￿nal sample used in the econometric analysis below is restricted to the post
Bretton Woods, 1975-2006 period.
3 Methodology
The output impact of natural disasters across countries is estimated using a panel autoregressive
distributed lags (PARDL) model that relates current output to its lagged values, and to contempo-
raneous and lagged indicators of the occurrence of various types of natural disasters. For a given
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where yi;t is the (growth of) real GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US dollars) of country i at time
t, and, in our baseline speci￿cation, D0
i;t = (GEOi;;t; CLIMi;t; OTHi;t)0 is a vector of variables
capturing the occurrence of geological, climatic, or other disasters, as described in the previous
section. However, the impact of di￿erent types of climatic disasters will also be separately estimated,
in which case
D0
i;t = (GEOi;;t; WINDi;t; FLOODi;t; DROUGHTi;t; TEMPi;t; OTHi;t)0;
where WIND, FLOOD, DROUGHT, and TEMP are indicators of the incidence of wind storms,
￿oods, droughts, and extreme temperatures, respectively. The parameters i and t are country
and year ￿xed-e￿ects that capture long run di￿erences in growth across countries and the impact
of global factors that are common to all countries in the sample and can be understood as the
6world business cycle. The residual term i;t corresponds to an error term that is assumed i.i.d. The
number of lags q is assumed to be equal in both summatories to ease comparison with the panel
VAR described below. Relaxing this assumption does not importantly change the results.
In addition to the baseline speci￿cation described above, I also estimate models that control for
the potential output impact of other external shocks. Since the speci￿cation described in equation
(1) already controls for common global factors in a non-parametric way (through the time ￿xed-
e￿ect), these additional external shocks only include country-speci￿c, time-varying variables. In
particular, I estimate versions of the model above that control for the impact of terms-of-trade, aid
￿ows, and real exchange rate shocks. Including these sources of ￿uctuations requires some non-
trivial modi￿cations to the empirical speci￿cation. The empirical speci￿cation corresponds in this
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where xi;t = (TTi;t; yi;t)0, TTi;t is the (growth of) a terms-of-trade index, and yi;t = (AIDi;t; GDPi;t)0
is now a vector of endogenous variables that includes the (growth of) real GDP per capita (in
constant 2000 US dollars) (GDP), and the (growth of) real per capita aid ￿ows (AID). Corre-
spondingly, the parameters of the model are now matrices, denoted by Aj, instead of scalars, and
the structural interpretation of the results depends on the identi￿cation of the parameters of the
contemporaneous matrix A0.
The main identi￿cation assumption of this empirical strategy is that the occurrence of natural
disasters is exogenous. They are assumed to be acts of God that are unrelated to any present or
past economic variable. Although the identi￿cation of the baseline model in equation (1) does not
require further assumptions, identifying the impact of other shocks in model (2) require additional
assumptions. Throughout the paper it is assumed that the terms-of-trade do not respond to the
y variables at any lags but probably have a contemporaneous and lagged e￿ect on them, which is
equivalent to imposing a diagonal structure in all the A matrices. For the developing and small
developed countries included in this study, these assumptions should be uncontroversial. The as-
sumption is more debatable for the developed countries included, but the assumption is maintained
to ease comparison across groups of countries and speci￿cations.
The aid ￿ows are included in the y vector because they are likely to respond to a country’s
economic performance, and are identi￿ed by assuming a contemporaneous causal order among the
variables included that is given by their position in the vector. This means that the A0matrix of
contemporaneous relations among the y variables is assumed to be block triangular, which corre-
sponds to assuming that output responds contemporaneously to changes in the aid ￿ows, but the
latter responds to changes in a country’s economic conditions only after a year. 4
The models described in equations (1) and (2) correspond to a PARDL and PVAR, respectively,
because they assume that the dynamics, represented by the di￿erent parameters and matrices,
4For a discussion on the delays on aid allocation, see Odedokun (2003)
7are common across the di￿erent cross-sectional units (countries) included in the estimation, which
are indexed by i. This is a standard assumption in this literature (see Broda (2004); Ahmed
(2003), Uribe and Yue (2006)) because, given the length of the time series dimension of the data
(around 30 annual observations), it is not possible to estimate country-speci￿c dynamics unless we
reduce importantly the number of exogenous shocks under consideration, the number of lags, or
both. However, as noticed by Robertson and Symons (1992), and Pesaran and Smith (1995), this
assumption may lead to obtaining coe￿cients that underestimate (overestimate) the short (long)
run impact of exogenous variables if the dynamics di￿er importantly across countries. For this
reason, I also check some of the results using the Pesaran and Smith (1995) mean group (MG)
estimator, which they show to estimate consistently the parameters of the model.
The baseline speci￿cation in equation (1) models the behavior of output growth (￿rst di￿erences
of the log). There are several reasons for this modeling choice. First, standard tests suggest the
presence of a unit root in the GDP series. The results of those tests are summarized in Table 2,
which presents summary statistics for standard unit root tests performed on a country-by-country
basis, as well as results from the Levin et al. (2002) panel unit root test. It is clear that the fraction
of countries where the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected is high for the levels of log GDP
but negligible for its ￿rst di￿erence. Also, the panel unit root test cannot reject the null hypothesis
of a unit root for the series in levels but it clearly does for the series in di￿erences. Second, previous
empirical papers in this literature (e.g. Broda (2004), Ahmed (2003), Loayza and Raddatz (2007))
have estimated di￿erence stationary models, so this speci￿cation has the advantage of being directly
comparable with the existing results. Finally, on a more pragmatic note, the estimated impulse
responses are better behaved in the model in di￿erences than in alternative models speci￿ed in
levels. Nevertheless, recognizing the low power of unit root tests I also present results for the model
in levels as a robustness check.
Evidence on the order of integration of the other series included in the panel VAR version of
the model is more ambiguous. Although in a majority of individual series the hypothesis of a unit
root cannot be rejected, panel unit root tests are sensitive to the number of lags included. This
sensitivity, however, largely disappears when testing for the presence of unit roots for the series in
di￿erences, case in which there is also a large fraction of countries where the hypothesis of a unit
root can be rejected, reasons for preferring to model the series in di￿erences.
Modeling the variables in ￿rst di￿erences also requires testing for the possibility of cointegration,
which is done using Pedroni (1999)’s test for cointegration in panels. The various statistics proposed
by Pedroni (1999) yield somewhat ambiguous results, although in most cases the null hypothesis
of no cointegration cannot be rejected (see Table 3). Moreover, Pedroni (2004) shows that for
the sample characteristics that are closer to those used in this paper (N larger than T) the panel-
rho test, which systematically cannot reject the null of no cointegration, has the best size and
power properties. Therefore, standard tests of unit root and cointegration suggest that the models
should be estimated a in di￿erences and without cointegration relation. Nevertheless, because of
the ambiguity of the tests, I also check the results after estimating the model in levels (which should
8yield a consistent albeit ine￿cient estimator under the null of cointegration). Results will prove to
be similar in both cases.
Standard lag tests suggest estimating the model including two annual lags (Schwartz information
criterion). Three annual lags are also considered for robustness.
The parameters of the two versions of the model, estimated in reduced form by OLS (eq. [1])
or SURE (eq. [2]) are used to recover the impulse-response functions (IRF) of per capita GDP to
each of the structural shocks using the variance-covariance matrices of reduced form errors derived
from these coe￿cients. The con￿dence bands for the IRF come from parametric bootstrapping on
the model assuming normally distributed reduced form errors.5
4 Results
This section presents the results from the estimation of the panel ARDL and panel VAR models
described above in the sample of countries that have experienced at least one large climatic disaster
since the 1950s. It ￿rst describes the results on the sample as a whole and then presents results
for sub-groups of the sample, split according to characteristics that have been mentioned to a￿ect
a country’s vulnerability to disasters.
4.1 The output impact of natural disasters
The dynamic responses of output to the various types of natural disasters obtained from the es-
timation of the parameters of equation (1) are depicted in Figure 4. The di￿erent panels of this
￿gure show the cumulative impulse-response functions (IRF) of (the growth of) real per capita GDP
(GDP) to each type of natural disaster, under the benchmark identi￿cation assumptions. Since the
model was estimated in growth rates, the cumulative IRF show the cumulative output e￿ect of each
of these shocks. The continuous line depicts the point estimate of the IRF, and the broken lines
show the 90% con￿dence bands obtained from the empirical distribution.
Climatic disasters have, on average, a negative, statistically signi￿cant impact on per capita GDP
(Panel A), which has a cumulative decline of 0.6 percent after a large climate related catastrophe. In
other words, in the long run, per capita GDP is 0.6 percent lower as a result of a single climatic event.
Most of the output cost (about 0.5 percent loss) occurs during the year of the disaster. In contrast,
geological disasters do not have a statistically signi￿cant output impact, and a slightly positive long-
run associated point estimate (Panel B). Other types of disasters (which include famines, epidemics,
etc.) also negatively a￿ect output, with an estimated cumulative output loss of about 2 percent
(Panel C) that is larger that that of climatic disasters, but less statistically signi￿cant.
5The procedure corresponds to repeating 100 times the following set of steps: (i) the estimated variance-covariance
matrix of the reduced form errors is used to simulate a random realization of the perturbations; (ii) the initial values
of the di￿erent variables, the baseline coe￿cients, and the simulated perturbations are used to simulate a new set of
observations for the variables in the VAR; (iii) a new set of coe￿cients is obtained from these ￿ctitious observations.
Each set of coe￿cients obtained from the bootstrapping procedure yields a di￿erent IRF; these IRFs are used to build
the 90% con￿dence interval by computing the Euclidean distance between each simulated IRF and the baseline one
and taking those IRFs whose distance falls between the 5th and 95th .percentile.
9A direct criticism of the results presented above is that they may be attributing to natural
disasters the impact of other external shocks that are excluded from the model. A commonly cited
source of external shocks is the variation in a country’s terms of trade. Another potential problem
with the baseline results is that the actual impact of the disasters may be compounded with the
response of the international community in the form of aid ￿ows. Results presented in Figure 5,
obtained from estimating the parameters of equation (2) that considers these two sources of external
￿uctuations, show that this is not the case. The dynamic responses show that terms-of-trade shocks
have a positive and signi￿cant e￿ect on per capita GDP; according to the estimates, a one standard
deviation increase in terms of trade (corresponding to a 13 percent increase) results in a cumulative
output e￿ect of about 0.7 percent. Sudden increases in aid ￿ows also positively impact output; in
this case a one standard deviation increase in per capita aid ￿ows (40 percent increase) induces a
0.4 percent increase in per capita GDP. Both results are in line with previous estimates obtained in
the literature (see Raddatz (2007)). However, the ￿gures also show that the impact of climatic and
other disasters is qualitatively and quantitatively similar across speci￿cations. The results from the
estimation of equation (1) were not driven by a spurious correlation between terms of trade shocks
and the occurrence of speci￿c disasters, nor were attenuated importantly by the responses of the
international community in terms of aid ￿ows.6
All ￿ndings documented above are also robust to changes in the number of lags used in the
estimation and to the estimation of the model in levels instead of di￿erences. Panels A and B
of Figure 6 show the dynamic responses obtained when using three lags in the estimation of the
baseline model in di￿erences and in levels, respectively. In the latter case, the output level is treated
as stationary, although the persistence of the response to the shocks indicates that this assumption
is probably incorrect. Nevertheless, the output costs of di￿erent shocks, which in this case are
given by the area under the dynamic response curves, are similar to those obtained in the baseline
estimation (not reported).
As mentioned in section 3, despite its advantages in terms of increased degrees of freedom and
power, pooled estimators may su￿er from important biases in presence of signi￿cant parameter
heterogeneity across cross-sectional units. Pesaran and Smith (1995) pointed out this problem and
suggested using a mean group estimator to obtain consistent estimates of the model’s parameters.
Their approach requires separately estimating the model’s parameters for each cross sectional unit
and averaging the estimated parameters, so it can only be implemented in the simplest version of
equation (1) which includes only three groups of disasters. Adding more variables or lags yields
individual models with too few degrees of freedom. Also, Pesaran and Smith (1995)’s approach
relies on having a large number of cross sectional units, so it can only be feasibly applied to the
whole sample of countries instead of the smaller groups considered later on. With these caveats,
the results obtained from applying this approach, summarized in the dynamic responses depicted in
Figure 7 show that the qualitative nature of the results is not a￿ected by the pooling across large
6The estimation of equation (1) in the sample of countries with terms of trade data also yield similar results as
above. The separate consideration of terms of trade and aid ￿ows to the model described in equation (2) also yields
similar results (both non reported).
10groups of countries. Quantitatively, however, most disasters have a higher impact according to this
estimator, which indicates that the pooled estimator may su￿er from attenuation. The estimated
cumulative output loss is in this case 1 percent of GDP for Climatic disasters and 5 percent of GDP
for Other Disasters (residual category). If these results o￿er some indication of the magnitude of
potential biases, they suggest that pooled estimators result in an attenuation of about 40 percent.
Therefore, while qualitatively correct, results from pooled VARs should probably be considered as
conservative estimates of the impact of natural disasters.
The results reported in Figure 4 quantify the impact of a general climatic disaster. However, this
category embeds di￿erent types of disasters that can arguably have di￿erent output consequences.
The dynamic responses of GDP per capita to various types of climatic disasters obtained from esti-
mating the extended version of equation (1) and depicted in Figure 8 check for this possibility. The
results show some interesting variation across disaster’s types. Droughts and extreme temperatures
are those with the largest average impact, reaching cumulative losses of 1 and 5 percent of GDP
respectively, both statistically signi￿cant at the 10 percent level. Results for extreme temperatures,
however have to be taken with caution because of the small set of countries a￿ected by this type of
disaster (only 12). When looking across the baseline sample of all countries a￿ected by some type
of climatic disaster, windstorms and ￿oods do not seem to have a signi￿cant output impact. It is
possible, however, that these types of disasters a￿ect speci￿c groups of countries. The results in the
following sections come back to this issue.
The dynamic responses reported so far depict the output e￿ect of a unique disaster occurring
at time zero. This approach implicitly treats disasters as independent events across time, whose
occurrence can be modeled as Bernoulli events. Because of the nature of catastrophes this is a
reasonable assumption. However, in the case of climatic disasters it is possible to argue for some
serial correlation in the incidence of disasters arising from climate cycles such as those associated
with El Niæo. In fact, the data show some statistically signi￿cant serial correlation among Climatic
disasters that is largely absent among other types of catastrophes (Table 4). No signi￿cant serial
correlation among other types of disasters or cross-correlations across disasters is found in the data.
Because of the serial correlation of climatic disasters, an alternative exercise is to model the expected
dynamic response of output to a climatic event taking into consideration that the event itself a￿ects
the probability of another event occurring in the future. Results allowing for serial correlation are
much like those reported in the baseline case, although climatic and other disasters have slightly
larger estimated output costs corresponding to 0.8 and 2.5 percent of per capita GDP, respectively
(not reported).
All results above use a measure of the incidence based on the number of disasters occurring
in a given year, regardless of the moment of the year the disaster takes place. In that sense, the
output e￿ects documented correspond to those of a disaster occurring at the sample average day of
the year (i.e. the average of the day of the year when the di￿erent events included in the sample
occurred). However, it might be argued that disasters occurring very late in a year may have little
contemporaneous output e￿ect and instead impact next year’s reported GDP. Results reported in
11Figure 9 consider this possibility by using the weighted incidence measure described in section 3.
This ￿gure, therefore, shows the dynamic responses of output to a disaster occurring on January
1st. It can be seen that the timing of the disaster makes a di￿erence: disasters occurring earlier
in the year have a larger annual impact on the year of the incident. For instance, compared to a
disaster occurring at the sample average day with a per-capita output loss of 0.6 percent, a climatic
disaster occurring on January 1st induces a loss of about 1 percent. This timing e￿ect should be
kept in mind during the rest of the paper that follows the convention of reporting results for disasters
occurring at the sample average day.
4.2 Are small states special?
It is often claimed that small states have a harder time dealing with natural disasters because of
their inability to diversify geographically. If this is the case we would expect disasters to have a
larger output impact in small states. This section tests this hypothesis comparing the dynamic
responses of output to natural disasters in small states (those with population smaller than one
million people) with that of larger countries. The results are depicted in Figures 10.
When looking at broad disaster’s categories, small states do not seem to be signi￿cantly more
a￿ected by disasters than larger countries (rows 1 to 3).7 In fact, there is no type of natural disaster
with signi￿cant impact among small states. In contrast, climatic disasters and those in the residual
category have a sizable negative signi￿cant e￿ect in the rest of the world, both with a cumulative loss
of about 0.5 percent. However, because of the broad con￿dence intervals reported for small states,
none of the di￿erences in responses between small states and the rest of the world is statistically
signi￿cant.
The previous ￿nding is not driven by potential biases in the pooled estimator, although the
magnitude of the response partly does. When estimating the impact of disasters using the MG
estimator there is a negative, but insigni￿cant response of small states’ output to climatic disasters,
but the magnitude of this response is similar to the (signi￿cant) response observed among other
countries (not reported). The evidence, therefore, indicates that small states do not respond more
than other countries to a general type of climatic disaster.
While not signi￿cantly more sensitive to broad categories of disasters, the di￿erences documented
above on the di￿erential impact of various types of climatic disasters suggest the possibility that
small might be more sensitive to the impact of speci￿c types of climatic disasters. This possibility is
checked by opening the climatic disaster category into its components, and estimating the response
of small states to these di￿erent climatic disasters. The results indicate that small states do have
a stronger response to wind storms than other states (row 4). The di￿erence between the response
of small and other states to this type of catastrophes is also statistically signi￿cant. 8 Small states
also exhibit a positive and signi￿cant response to ￿oods (not reported), but this last result has to
7Within a row, ￿gures are reported on the same scale to ease comparison.
8The signi￿cance is based on the empirical distribution of the di￿erential response, estimated in a nested version
of the model.
12be taken with caution because only 7 of the 16 small states in the sample experienced one ￿ood in
the sample period. The identi￿cation of this result, therefore, relies on very little information. In
contrast, 15 of the 16 small states experienced windstorms, and typically several of them during the
period. The composition of the countervailing response of small states to windstorms and ￿oods
explains the lack of di￿erential response documented in the aggregate. Among small states, a wind
storm typically results in a cumulative output loss of 2 percent of GDP, while the same ￿gure among
larger states is an insigni￿cant increase of 0.3 percent. On the other hand, droughts and extreme
temperature events have a higher impact among larger countries (more on this below). Considering
wind storms in isolation in the sub-sample of countries a￿ected by this type of disasters yields
similar results (not reported). 9
4.3 Does the level of development matter?
Less developed countries are also frequently considered as having more di￿culty in dealing with
natural disasters because of budgetary restrictions. A government that is cash strapped can hardly
gather the resources to respond to natural catastrophes. To explore the validity of these claims,
results in this section present the dynamic response of output to various types of disasters for
countries at di￿erent levels of income.
The results clearly show that low-income countries respond more strongly to climatic disasters
(Figure 11, columns 1 to 3). Among these countries, a climatic disaster results in a cumulative
per-capita output loss of about 1 percent, which is also statistically signi￿cant at the 10 percent
level during the initial years. For middle and high-income countries, climatic disasters result in
cumulative losses of 0.5 and 0.25 percent respectively, the former also being statistically signi￿cant
at the 10 percent level. This di￿erence is also statistically signi￿cant at 10 percent level.
Separately estimating the impact of di￿erent types of climatic disasters across income groups
shows that the largest response of low-income countries to climatic disasters is mainly due to the
large output impact that droughts have on this group (Column 4). A drought results in a cumulative
output loss of 2 percent of GDP in low-income countries. The di￿erence is signi￿cant only at 15
percent level, however. Poor countries also seem to respond much more strongly to episodes of
extreme temperatures (not reported), but this result is based only on one episode, so it is not a
robust pattern of the data. In contrast, there is no signi￿cant response to any type of disaster among
middle and high-income countries, although the impact of windstorms in middle-income countries
is nearly signi￿cant (not reported).10
The stronger response of low-income countries to climatic disasters is not only driven by a higher
share of agriculture in these countries GDP. While the share of agriculture is indeed larger in low-
income countries (38 percent versus 11 percent in the rest of the world), the response of low income
9Results for mean group estimations within the group of small countries cannot be relied on because, by opening
climatic disasters into its components, the underlying equation cannot be estimated on a country-by-country basis
without running out of degrees of freedom.
10The response becomes signi￿cant if, instead of building the con￿dence bands based on the Euclidean distance
among IRFs, one uses the empirical distribution of the responses at each point in time.
13countries to climatic disasters is larger even after controlling for the agriculture share of GDP. This
is shown in Figure 12 that compares the cumulative output e￿ect of climatic disasters among low
and high-income countries with low and high shares of agriculture in GDP (above and below the
sample median). While the impact of these disasters is clearly lower among countries with a small
agricultural share, the output consequences are are always larger for low-income countries. Also,
despite the wide con￿dence intervals obtained for high (non low) income countries, the one sided
test that the response is larger for low income countries cannot reject the null at the 10 percent
level of signi￿cance.
4.4 Does indebtedness matter?
A country’s level of indebtedness is also frequently mentioned as a limit to its capacity to respond
to disasters and, therefore, to the impact that catastrophes may have on output. Countries that
have to service large amounts of debt have little ￿scal space to quickly react to catastrophes and
provide relief and reconstruction. Results comparing the dynamic responses of output to disasters
for countries with di￿erent initial ratios of external debt to GDP (measured by the average ratio of
external debt to GDP during the period 1975-1980) show that this is not the case. 11
The results show no correlation between the level of initial indebtedness and the impact of
various types of disasters (Figure 13). The cumulative output loss of climatic disasters is almost
identical for countries with initial debts below and above the median level of 30 percent of GDP.
In contrast to previous results, in this case opening for type of climatic disasters indicates does not
change the qualitative conclusion (not reported). For no type of climatic disasters there is a clearly
di￿erential response among more indebted countries.
It may be the case that only extreme debt levels amplify the impact of disasters. To check for
this possibility, instead of comparing countries above and below the median level of indebtedness,
the sample is divided in three groups of initial indebtedness de￿ned by the 33rd and 66th percentiles
of this variable. The results are largely unchanged (not reported), most indebted countries do not
seem to exhibit a stronger output response to climatic disasters than countries with intermediate
or low levels of debt.
5 Final Remarks
There is nowadays increasing concern about the consequences of the process of global warming on
various aspects of economic performance such as a country’s productive structure, environmental
costs, costs of reducing emissions, and exposure to natural disasters. Disasters typically have dev-
astating e￿ects on physical and human capital, with losses as a percentage of GDP that easily reach
11I use initial ratios to address potential endogeneity concerns on the relation between the incidence of disasters
and indebtedness over the sample period. Ideally one would like to use ratios from before the sample period but this is
inconvenient for two reasons. First, the sample of countries with debt information is already smaller than the overall
sample, going further back in time reduces the sample even more. Second, in addition to the lack of data, many
countries in the sample obtained their independence during the 1960s, it is unclear how these post-independence debt
ratios have to be interpreted.
14two digits. However, from a welfare point of view it is especially relevant to assess the cost of
catastrophes in terms of forgone output and consumption, more than determining their impact on
the stocks.
This paper uses a broad set of data to quantify the cost of natural disasters, especially those
related to climatic events, in terms of GDP per capita. The results indicate that disasters have
modest but economically meaningful output consequences, resulting on a decline in output per
capita of about 1 percent. To ￿x ideas, this is larger than the typical impact of terms-of-trade
shocks, which are frequently considered as important sources of ￿uctuations. The paper also shows
an increase in incidence of these disasters of about 30 percent in the last decades, which implies an
increased expected output cost of about 0.3 percent of per capita GDP.
It is important to highlight in these ￿nal remarks that these estimates come from a semi-
structural model that does not cover all the potentially relevant macroeconomic variables. This
means that the estimated output responses are conditional on the endogenous responses taken to
alleviate their consequences. Although the paper shows that the most obvious of these responses
in terms of foreign aid ￿ows reduces only marginally the impact of the shocks, it is not possible to
extrapolate these results to other palliative measures coming, for instance, from local government
spending. The estimates are therefore an accurate description of the reduced form cost of disasters
but probably a conservative estimate of the cost that would be observed in the absence of any
mitigation e￿ort.
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17Figure 1: Incidence of Climatic Disasters Around the World
The figure displays the average incidence (number of disasters per year) of climatic disasters (windstorms, floods, droughts, and extreme temperatures)
around the world. Different shades indicate thata c ountry belongs to different quartiles of the distribution of incidence. Darker shades indicate a higher






18Figure 2. Incidence of Various Types of Climatic Disasters Across the World
A. Wind Storms B. Floods
C. Droughts D. Extreme Temperatures
Each panel displays the average incidence (number of disasters per year) of a different type of climatic disaster (windstorms, floods, droughts, and extreme temperatures) around the world. Different shades


















19Figure 3. Evolution of the Average World Incidence of Various Disasters
The different panels of the figure display the evolution of the average world incidence of disasters, corresponding to the total number of
disasters of a given type in a year divided by the total number of countries in the sample, during the 1960-2006 period, as well as a fitted
trend line showing the evolution of each series
A. Geological Disasters B. Climatic Disasters
C. Other Disasters D. Windstorms
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20Figure 4. Output Effect of Natural Disasters, 1975-2006.
The different figures show the estimated response of per-capita GDP to the ocurrence
at time zero of various types of natural disasters, indicated at the top of each figures,
(solid lines) and its 90 percent confidence interval (broken lines). Time horizon is in
years.
21Figure 5. Cumulative Output Effect of Disasters Controlling for Terms of Trade and Aid Shocks
The different figures show the estimated cumulative (per capita) output effect of a time zero, one standard
deviation orthogonal shock to the variable indicated at the top of the figure (solid lines) and its 90 percent
confidence interval (broken lines), except for the cases of Climatic, Geological, and Other disasters, which
report the cumulative impulse response to the occurrence of one of these events. The time horizon is in years.
22Figure 6. Output Effect of Natural Disasters Under Alternative Model Specifications.
In Panel A, the different figures show the response of per-capita GDP to the ocurrence of various types of
natural disasters (indicated at the top of each figures) at time zero (solid lines) and its 90 percent confidence
interval (broken lines) for the panel ARDL model estimated in differences and including three lags of each
variable. Figures in Panel B instead exhibit the response of per capita GDP to similar shocks, coming from a
model estimated in levels and including three lags of each variable. In both cases the time horizon is in years.
23Figure 7. Output Effect of Natural Disasters, 1975-2006. Mean Group Estimates.
The different figures show the effect on per-capita GDP of various types of natural disasters (indicated at the
top of each figures) at time zero (solid lines) and its 90 percent confidence interval (broken lines) estimated
using Pesaran and Smith (1995) Mean Group (MG) estimator. Time horizon is in years.
24The different figures show the estimated response of per-capita GDP to the ocurrence at time zero of various types of natural
disasters, indicated at the top of each figure, (solid lines) and its 90 percent confidence interval (broken lines). Time horizon
is in years.
Figure 8. Output Effect of Different Climatic Disasters and other Types of Catastrophes, 1975-2006.
25Figure 9. Output Effect of Natural Disasters. Considering within Year Timing
The different figures show the estimated response of per-capita GDP to the ocurrence of various types of
natural disasters, indicated at the top of each figures, at the first day of the year indicated as time zero (solid
lines) and its 90 percent confidence interval (broken lines). Time horizon is in years.
26Figure 10. Output Effect of Natural Disasters, 1975-2006. Small States and Rest of the World
The various figures exhibit the estimated response of per-capita GDP to the ocurrence at time zero of various
types of natural disasters, indicated at the top of each figure, (solid lines) and its 90 percent confidence interval
(broken lines). Windstorms are a sub-category of Climatic Disasters. Other sub-categories (not reported) include
Droughts, Floods, and Extreme Temperatures. Panel A presents results for small states (countries with average
population during 1975-2006 smaller than one million people), and Panel B shows similar results for the rest of
the world (countries with average population above one million people). In both panels time horizon is in years.
27Figure 11. Cumulative Output Effect of Broad Classes of Natural Disasters by Income Level
The different figures show the estimated response of per-capita GDP to the ocurrence at time zero of various types of natural disasters, indicated at the top of
each figures, (solid lines) and its 90 percent confidence interval (broken lines). Time horizon is in years. Droughts are a sub-category of Climatic Disasters.
Other sub-categories (not reported) include Windstorms, Floods, and Extreme Temperatures. Panels A to C show results for low, middle, and high income
countries, respectively. Countries are separated in income bins according to the classification of the World Bank (2008) World Development Indicators.
28A. Low Agriculture Share of GDP
B. High Agriculture Share of GDP
Figure 12. Output Effect of Climatic Disasters by Income
Level and Agricultural Share of GDP.
The different figures show the effect on per-capita GDP of a climatic
disaster at time zero on low-income and high- and middle-income countries
controlling for the importance of agriculture as a share of GDP. Panel A
compares the response of low and high income countries with agricultural
shares of GDP below the cross country median (20%). Panel B presents the




















29Figure 13. Cumulative Output Impact of Broad Categories of Disasters by Initial Indebtedness
The various figures exhibit the response of per-capita GDP to the ocurrence at time zero of various types of
natural disasters, indicated at the top of each figure, (solid lines) and its 90 percent confidence interval (broken
lines). Panel A presents results for countries with average levels of external debt to GDP during 1975-1980
below 30 percent and Panel B shows similar results for countries with average initial debt above 30 percent of


































Albania 0.0155 0.0782 10.88 0 0.21875 0 0.0625 0 0.09375 0.0625
Algeria 0.0089 0.0118 0.47 -0.0432 0.0625 0.03125 0.03125 0 0 0 0.03125
Argentina 0.0066 0.0018 0.07 0 0.28125 0 0 0 0 0.28125
Australia 0.0187 0.0060 -0.0025 0 0.5 0 0.1875 0.125 0.1875 0
Austria 0.0209 -0.0027 0.0045 0 0.03125 0 0 0 0 0.03125
Bangladesh 0.0222 0.0098 4.78 0.03125 1.125 0.0625 0.34375 0 0.0625 0.71875
Belgium 0.0193 -0.0006 -0.0001 0 0.03125 0 0 0.03125 0 0
Benin 0.0051 -0.0157 10.10 0 0.40625 0 0 0 0.125 0.28125
Bhutan 0.0553 16.68 0 0.0625 0.03125 0.03125 0 0 0.03125
Bolivia 0.0000 0.0031 7.14 -0.0237 0.0625 0.53125 0 0 0 0.15625 0.375
Botswana 0.0543 -0.0186 5.38 0 0.28125 0.0625 0 0 0.21875 0.0625
Brazil 0.0108 -0.0104 0.05 0 0.3125 0 0 0 0.1875 0.125
Bulgaria 0.0201 -0.0050 1.88 0.0668 0 0.0625 0 0 0 0 0.0625
Burkina Faso 0.0176 0.0098 13.25 0 0.375 0.09375 0 0 0.34375 0.03125
Burundi -0.0065 -0.0175 20.37 -0.0171 0 0.15625 0.0625 0 0 0.15625 0
Cameroon 0.0047 0.0094 4.54 -0.0078 0.03125 0.0625 0 0 0 0.0625 0
Cape Verde 0.0321 24.66 0.03125 0.125 0.0625 0.0625 0 0.0625 0
Central African Republic -0.0141 -0.0051 12.10 -0.0100 0 0.0625 0 0 0 0 0.0625
Chad 0.0082 -0.0134 11.98 0.0206 0 0.34375 0.03125 0 0 0.21875 0.125
Chile 0.0365 0.0166 0.18 -0.0183 0.0625 0.28125 0 0.0625 0 0.03125 0.1875
China 0.0773 -0.0120 0.31 -0.0430 0.03125 1.6875 0 0.5 0 0.375 0.8125
Colombia 0.0163 0.0130 0.32 -0.0145 0.09375 0.09375 0 0 0 0 0.09375
Comoros -0.0025 -0.0222 22.12 0.0625 0.125 0.09375 0.125 0 0 0
Congo, Dem. Rep. -0.0402 0.0062 9.88 -0.0716 0 0.09375 0.03125 0 0 0.09375 0
Congo, Rep. 0.0079 0.0086 8.30 0 0.15625 0 0 0 0 0.15625
Costa Rica 0.0171 -0.0056 1.76 -0.0181 0.0625 0.25 0 0.125 0 0 0.125
Cyprus 0.0428 -0.0016 1.51 -0.0033 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Denmark 0.0201 0.0036 0.0042 0 0.09375 0 0.0625 0 0.03125 0
Dominica 0.0334 12.77 -0.0011 0 0.1875 0.03125 0.1875 0 0 0
Dominican Republic 0.0238 -0.0200 1.15 -0.0116 0 0.21875 0 0.125 0 0 0.09375
Ecuador 0.0094 -0.0063 1.15 -0.0184 0.125 0.1875 0.03125 0 0 0 0.1875
El Salvador 0.0022 -0.0002 4.37 0.125 0.1875 0.0625 0.0625 0 0.0625 0.0625
Ethiopia 0.0057 -0.0087 9.97 -0.0039 0 0.59375 0.03125 0 0 0.5625 0.03125
Fiji 0.0107 0.0005 2.84 -0.0150 0 0.59375 0 0.5 0 0.0625 0.03125
France 0.0178 -0.0023 -0.0007 0 0.0625 0 0.03125 0.03125 0 0
Gabon -0.0136 -0.0037 1.82 -0.0314 0 0.03125 0 0 0 0 0.03125
Gambia, The 0.0018 -0.0285 21.46 -0.0384 0 0.28125 0.0625 0.03125 0 0.21875 0.03125
Ghana 0.0060 -0.0185 8.20 -0.0756 0 0.21875 0 0 0 0.09375 0.125
Greece 0.0177 0.0059 0.0132 0.125 0.03125 0 0 0 0.03125 0
Grenada 0.0323 5.86 0.0056 0 0.15625 0.03125 0.15625 0 0 0
Guatemala 0.0063 0.0011 1.48 0.03125 0.15625 0 0.0625 0 0.03125 0.0625
Guinea 0.0069 -0.0503 9.78 0 0.03125 0 0 0 0 0.03125
Guinea-Bissau -0.0104 -0.0072 44.52 0 0.0625 0.21875 0 0 0.0625 0
Guyana 0.0056 -0.0157 16.31 -0.0612 0 0.15625 0.09375 0 0 0.0625 0.09375
Haiti -0.0164 0.0089 9.00 0 0.375 0.0625 0.1875 0 0.0625 0.125
Honduras 0.0108 0.0043 7.87 0 0.59375 0 0.15625 0 0.1875 0.25
Hungary 0.0215 -0.0060 0.49 0.0193 0 0.09375 0 0 0 0.0625 0.03125
India 0.0341 -0.0073 0.66 0.0625 1.15625 0 0.15625 0 0.21875 0.78125
Indonesia 0.0380 0.0136 1.13 0.0625 0.03125 0.09375 0 0 0.03125 0
Iran, Islamic Rep. -0.0002 0.0102 0.09 -0.0011 0.15625 0.21875 0 0 0 0.09375 0.125
Israel 0.0170 0.0006 3.19 -0.0060 0 0.03125 0 0 0.03125 0 0
Italy 0.0196 0.0025 0.0019 0.0625 0.09375 0 0 0.03125 0 0.0625
Jamaica 0.0038 -0.0017 3.21 0 0.34375 0 0.15625 0 0 0.1875
Japan 0.0219 -0.0096 -0.0065 0.09375 0 0.03125 0 0 0 0
Jordan 0.0214 0.0075 13.14 0 0.125 0 0 0.03125 0.0625 0.03125
Kenya 0.0042 -0.0009 6.68 0.03125 0.5 0.0625 0 0 0.4375 0.0625
Korea, Rep. 0.0554 -0.0089 0.12 0 0.125 0 0.0625 0 0 0.0625
Lesotho 0.0293 -0.0184 10.15 0.0087 0 0.28125 0 0 0 0.21875 0.0625
Liberia -0.0569 18.41 0 0.03125 0.0625 0 0.03125 0 0
Luxembourg 0.0339 0.0011 -0.0005 0 0.15625 0 0.125 0.03125 0 0
Madagascar -0.0140 -0.0043 10.41 0 0.875 0 0.53125 0 0.3125 0.03125
Malawi -0.0011 0.0018 20.00 -0.0290 0.03125 0.5 0 0 0 0.3125 0.1875
Malaysia 0.0384 0.0046 0.40 -0.0146 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mali 0.0083 -0.0008 16.74 0 0.28125 0.0625 0 0 0.28125 0
Mauritania 0.0017 0.0074 22.57 0 0.5625 0 0 0 0.46875 0.09375
Mauritius 0.0406 -0.0225 1.91 0 0.25 0.03125 0.21875 0 0.03125 0
Mexico 0.0139 -0.0015 0.06 0.03125 0.1875 0.03125 0.15625 0 0 0.03125
Mongolia 0.0166 10.70 0 0.28125 0.0625 0.1875 0 0.09375 0
Morocco 0.0199 0.0082 2.76 -0.0114 0.03125 0.09375 0 0 0 0.09375 0
Mozambique 0.0169 -0.0475 29.45 0 0.96875 0.03125 0.125 0 0.5 0.34375
Nepal 0.0178 -0.0002 8.18 0.125 0.25 0 0 0 0.09375 0.15625
Netherlands 0.0184 -0.0010 0.0008 0 0.03125 0 0.03125 0 0 0
Nicaragua -0.0163 -0.0070 16.91 -0.2354 0.0625 0.34375 0.0625 0.125 0 0.09375 0.125
Niger -0.0113 0.0203 13.93 0 0.46875 0.09375 0 0 0.40625 0.0625
Nigeria 0.0012 0.0177 1.08 -0.0440 0 0.125 0 0 0 0.09375 0.03125
Oman 0.0263 1.22 0 0.03125 0 0.03125 0 0 0
Pakistan 0.0258 -0.0216 2.62 -0.0256 0.0625 0.375 0 0 0 0 0.375
Panama 0.0144 -0.0008 0.89 0.03125 0.09375 0 0.03125 0 0.03125 0.03125
Papua New Guinea -0.0008 -0.0049 10.64 -0.0161 0.09375 0.25 0 0.03125 0 0.125 0.09375
Paraguay 0.0105 0.0171 1.22 -0.0279 0 0.28125 0.03125 0 0 0.03125 0.25
Peru 0.0033 0.0114 1.11 0.03125 0.34375 0.0625 0 0.0625 0.0625 0.21875


































Philippines 0.0101 0.0023 1.37 -0.0122 0.09375 1.90625 0 1.59375 0 0.125 0.1875
Portugal 0.0243 0.0048 -0.0012 0 0.03125 0.0625 0 0.03125 0 0
Romania 0.0107 -0.0116 0.93 0.0050 0.03125 0.125 0 0 0 0.03125 0.09375
Rwanda 0.0081 0.0018 19.62 0 0.375 0 0 0 0.375 0
Samoa 0.0165 19.45 -0.0047 0 0.15625 0.03125 0.125 0 0 0.03125
Senegal 0.0001 -0.0087 10.58 0 0.40625 0.03125 0.03125 0 0.3125 0.0625
Seychelles 0.0239 0.0284 8.14 0.03125 0.0625 0.03125 0.03125 0 0 0.03125
Sierra Leone -0.0076 0.0163 16.85 -0.0291 0 0.0625 0 0.03125 0 0 0.03125
Solomon Islands 0.0164 26.02 -0.0195 0.0625 0.125 0.03125 0.125 0 0 0
South Africa 0.0023 0.0003 0.33 -0.0089 0 0.1875 0 0.03125 0 0.125 0.03125
Spain 0.0207 0.0051 0.0121 0 0.375 0.03125 0.03125 0.03125 0.25 0.0625
Sri Lanka 0.0339 0.0154 6.06 0.03125 1.125 0 0.0625 0 0.25 0.8125
St. Lucia 0.0314 4.42 -0.0095 0 0.125 0 0.125 0 0 0
Vincent and the Grenadines 0.0373 7.84 -0.0095 0.03125 0.15625 0 0.125 0 0 0.03125
Sudan 0.0174 0.0008 6.36 0 0.5 0.03125 0 0 0.3125 0.1875
Suriname 0.0032 7.16 0 0.03125 0.03125 0 0 0 0.03125
Swaziland 0.0112 -0.0125 4.77 0 0.4375 0 0.0625 0 0.34375 0.03125
Sweden 0.0171 -0.0086 -0.0041 0 0.03125 0 0.03125 0 0 0
Switzerland 0.0108 0.0098 0.0045 0 0.09375 0 0.03125 0.03125 0 0.03125
Syrian Arab Republic 0.0112 -0.0010 4.26 0 0.0625 0 0 0 0.0625 0
Thailand 0.0472 -0.0156 0.69 0.03125 0.8125 0 0.09375 0 0.09375 0.625
Togo -0.0084 0.0098 9.77 -0.0169 0 0.15625 0.03125 0 0 0.03125 0.125
Trinidad and Tobago 0.0232 0.0094 0.18 0.0045 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tunisia 0.0258 -0.0076 2.33 -0.0247 0 0.09375 0 0 0 0.03125 0.0625
Turkey 0.0209 0.0033 0.34 0.25 0.03125 0 0 0 0 0.03125
Uganda 0.0187 -0.0125 10.52 -0.1014 0.03125 0.34375 0 0 0 0.3125 0.03125
United States 0.0208 -0.0047 -0.0078 0 0.09375 0 0.09375 0 0 0
Uruguay 0.0152 -0.0023 0.26 -0.0060 0 0.09375 0 0 0 0.0625 0.03125
Venezuela, RB -0.0038 0.0466 0.04 -0.0105 0 0.03125 0 0 0 0 0.03125
Zambia -0.0115 -0.0171 17.07 0.0178 0 0.28125 0 0 0 0.125 0.15625
Zimbabwe -0.0144 -0.0104 3.88 0 0.40625 0.03125 0 0 0.34375 0.0625
Mean 0.013671867 -0.00092461 7.90 -0.0158 0.022321429 0.271484375 0.020089286 0.068359375 0.004464286 0.099888393 0.098772321
Median 0.01536535 -0.0007737 5.86 -0.0095 0 0.15625 0 0 0 0.046875 0.03125
Stdev 0.018528551 0.015686309 8.16 0.0368 0.041191385 0.318136976 0.03325683 0.176304823 0.015614942 0.133365834 0.165016122
P25 0.0036895 -0.0086944 1.15 -0.0195 0 0.0625 0 0 0 0 0
P75 0.021575075 0.006474525 10.88 -0.0005 0.03125 0.34375 0.03125 0.0625 0 0.1328125 0.125
32Groups




A. Tests for Series in levels
Automatic lag selection 85 73 69
All countries with 2 lags 88 90 88
Automatic lag selection 96.00 77.00 66.00
Automatic lag selection 0.27 0 0
All countries with 2 lags 0.99 0.99 0.96
B. Tests for Series in Differences
Automatic lag selection 14 1 4
All countries with 2 lags 44 23 28
Automatic lag selection 12.00 1.00 2.00
Automatic lag selection 0 0 0
All countries with 2 lags 0 0.01 0.21
III. P-values of Levin-Lin-Chu test
Table 2. Unit Root Tests
II. Fraction of countries that cannot reject UR in PP test
III. P-values of Levin-Lin-Chu test
I. Fraction of countries that cannot reject UR in ADF test
II. Fraction of countries that cannot reject UR in PP test
I. Fraction of countries that cannot reject UR in ADF test
The table shows the results of country-by-country and panel unit root
tests performed for the main series used in the paper. The first and
second halves of the table (Panels A and B) show the tests for the
series in levels and differences, respectively. In each panel, sections I
and II report the fraction of countries inthe sample in which a
standard, country-by-country augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillips-
Perron tests could not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root selecting
the optimal number of lags on a country by country basis, or using the
optimal number of 2 lags for the system as a whole. Section III shows
the p-values of the Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) panel unit root test obtained
for each variable. All the tests allow for a country-specific intercept
and trend, and use the Newey-West bandwith selection with the
Bartlett kernel for the estimation of the long run variance of the series.
33Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs.
Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob.
Panel v-Statistic 6.12 0.00 3.31 0.00
Panel rho-Statistic 5.38 1.00 10.38 1.00
Panel PP-Statistic 0.61 0.73 1.73 0.96
Panel ADF-Statistic -1.48 0.07 1.46 0.93
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.
Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob.
Group rho-Statistic 6.83 1.00 12.64 1.00
Group PP-Statistic 0.71 0.76 0.91 0.82
Group ADF-Statistic -2.7 0.00 -1.19 0.12
VAR including GDP and TT
VAR including GDP, TT,
and AID
The table reports the statistic and associated p-value of the
different variants of Pedroni's (1999) panel cointegration test. The
null hypothesis in each case is no cointegration.
Table 3. Panel cointegration tests
34(1) (2) (3)
Geological Climatic Other







Country FE Yes Yes Yes
N 3584 3584 3584













Country FE Yes Yes Yes
N 1260 3360 1320
Panel A reports the results of regressions of each disaster
incidence measure (at the top of the column) on the other two
broad measures and a set of country fixed effects. Panel B runs
similar regressions of each disaster incidence measure on two
of its lags and a set of country fixed effects. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
Table 4. Cross and Serial Correlation of Disaster
Measures
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